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Figure 1: Are CNN-generated images hard to distinguish from real images? We show that a classifier trained to detect images generated
by only one CNN (ProGAN, far left) can detect those generated by many other models (remaining columns). Our code and models are
available at https://peterwang512.github.io/CNNDetection/.
Abstract
In this work we ask whether it is possible to create
a “universal” detector for telling apart real images from
these generated by a CNN, regardless of architecture or
dataset used. To test this, we collect a dataset consisting
of fake images generated by 11 different CNN-based im-
age generator models, chosen to span the space of com-
monly used architectures today (ProGAN, StyleGAN, Big-
GAN, CycleGAN, StarGAN, GauGAN, DeepFakes, cas-
caded refinement networks, implicit maximum likelihood es-
timation, second-order attention super-resolution, seeing-
in-the-dark). We demonstrate that, with careful pre- and
post-processing and data augmentation, a standard image
classifier trained on only one specific CNN generator (Pro-
GAN) is able to generalize surprisingly well to unseen ar-
chitectures, datasets, and training methods (including the
just released StyleGAN2 [22]). Our findings suggest the
intriguing possibility that today’s CNN-generated images
share some common systematic flaws, preventing them from
achieving realistic image synthesis.
1. Introduction
Recent rapid advances in deep image synthesis tech-
niques, such as Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs),
have generated a huge amount of public interest and con-
cern, as people worry that we are entering a world where it
will be impossible to tell which images are real and which
are fake [15]. This issue has started to play a significant role
in global politics; in one case a video of the president of
Gabon that was claimed by opposition to be fake was one
factor leading to a failed coup d’etat∗. Much of this con-
cern has been directed at specific manipulation techniques,
such as “deepfake”-style face replacement [3], and photo-
realistic synthetic humans [21]. However, these methods
represent only two instances of a broader set of techniques:
image synthesis via convolutional neural networks (CNNs).
Our goal in this work is to find a general image forensics
approach for detecting CNN-generated imagery.
Detecting whether an image was generated by a spe-
cific synthesis technique is relatively straightforward — just
train a classifier on a dataset consisting of real images and
images synthesized by the technique in question. However,
such an approach will likely be tied to the dataset used in
image generation (e.g. faces), and, due to dataset bias [40],
might not generalize when tested on new data (e.g. cars).
Even worse, the technique-specific detector is likely to soon
become ineffective as generation methods evolve and the
technique it was trained on becomes obsolete.
It is natural, therefore, to ask whether today’s CNN-
generated images contain common artifacts, e.g., some kind
of detectable CNN fingerprints, that would allow a classi-
fier to generalize to an entire family of generation meth-
ods, rather than a single one. Unfortunately, prior work
has reported generalization to be a significant problem for
∗https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2019/03/
deepfake-gabon-ali-bongo/
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image forensics approaches. For example, several recent
works [48, 13, 41] observe that that classifiers trained on
images produced by one GAN architecture perform poorly
when tested on others, and in many cases they also fail
to generalize when only the dataset (and not the architec-
ture or task) is changed [48]. This makes sense, as image
generation methods are highly varied: they use different
datasets, network architectures, loss functions, and image
pre-processing.
In this paper, we show that, contrary to this current un-
derstanding, classifiers trained to detect CNN-generated im-
ages can exhibit a surprising amount of generalization abil-
ity across datasets, architectures, and tasks. We follow con-
ventions and train our classifiers in a straightforward man-
ner, by generating a large number of fake images using a
single CNN model (we use ProGAN, a high-performing un-
conditional GAN model [20]), and train a binary classifier
to detect fakes, using the model’s real training images as
negative examples.
To evaluate our model, we create a new dataset of CNN-
generated images, the ForenSynths dataset, consisting of
synthesized images from 11 models, that range from from
unconditional image generation methods, such as Style-
GAN [21], to super-resolution methods [14], and deep-
fakes [38]. Each model is trained on a different image
dataset appropriate for its specific task. We have also
continued evaluating our detector on models that were re-
leased after our paper was originally written, finding that
it works out-of-the-box on the very recent unconditional
GAN, StyleGAN2 [22].
Underneath the apparent simplicity of this approach, we
have found that there are a number of subtle challenges
which we study through a set of experiments and a new
dataset of trained image generation models. We find that
data augmentation, in the form of common image post-
processing operations, is critical for generalization, even
when the target images are not post-processed themselves.
We also find that diversity of training images matters; large
datasets sampled from CNN synthesis methods lead to clas-
sifiers that outperform those trained on smaller datasets, to
a point. Finally, it is critical to examine the effect of post-
processing on the model’s generalization ability which of-
ten occur downstream of image creation (e.g., during stor-
age and distribution). We show that when the correct steps
are taken, classifiers are indeed robust to common opera-
tions such as JPEG compression, blurring, and resizing.
In summary, our main contributions are: 1) we show that
forensics models trained on CNN-generated images exhibit
a surprising amount of generalization to other CNN synthe-
sis methods; 2) we propose a new dataset and evaluation
metric for detecting CNN-generated images; 3) we exper-
imentally analyze the factors that account for cross-model
generalization.
2. Related work
Detecting CNN-based Manipulations Several recent
works have addressed the problem of detecting images gen-
erated by CNNs. Ro¨ssler et al. [38] evaluated methods
for detecting face manipulation techniques, including CNN-
based face and mouth replacement methods. While they
showed that simple classifiers could detect fakes generated
by the same model, they did not study generalization be-
tween models or datasets. Marra et al. [28] likewise showed
that simple classifiers can detect images created by an image
translation network [18], but did not consider cross-model
transfer.
Recently, Cozzolino et al. [13] found that forensics clas-
sifiers transferred poorly between models, often obtaining
near-chance performance. They propose a new represen-
tation learning method, based on autoencoders, to improve
transfer performance in zero- and low-shot training regimes
for a variety of generation methods. While their ultimate
goal is similar to ours, they take an orthogonal approach.
They focus on new learning methods for improving transfer
learning, and apply them to a diverse assortment of models
(including both CNN and non-CNN). In contrast, we em-
pirically study the performance of simple “baseline” clas-
sifiers under different training and testing conditions for
CNN-based image generation. Zhang et al. [48] finds that
classifiers generalize poorly between GAN models. They
propose a method called AutoGAN for generating images
that contain the upsampling artifacts common in GAN ar-
chitectures, and test it on two types of GANs. Other work
has proposed to detect GAN images using hand-crafted co-
occurrence features [30], or by anomaly detection models
built on pretrained face detectors [41]. Researchers have
also proposed methods for identifying which, of several,
known GANs generated a given image [29, 45].
Image forensics Researchers have proposed a variety of
methods for detecting more traditional manipulation tech-
niques, such as those made by image editing tools. Early
work focused on hand-crafted cues [15] such as com-
pression artifacts [4], resampling [36], or physical scene
constraints [31]. More recently, researchers have applied
learning-based methods to these problems [49, 17, 12, 37,
42]. This line of work has found, like us, that simple, su-
pervised classifiers are often effective at detecting manipu-
lations [49, 42].
Artifacts from CNN-based Generators Researchers
have shown, recently, that common CNN designs contain
artifacts that reduce their representational power. Much of
this work has focused on the way networks perform upam-
pling and downsampling. A well-known example of such
an artifact is the checkerboard artifact produced by decon-
volutional layers [32]. Azulay and Weiss [5] showed convo-
lutional networks ignore the classical sampling theorem and
that strided convolutions therefore reduce translation invari-
ance, and Zhang [47] improved translation invariance by re-
ducing aliasing in these layers. Very recently, Bau et al. [6]
suggested that GANs have limited generation capacity, and
analyzed the image structures that a pretrained GAN is un-
able to produce.
3. A dataset of CNN-based generation models
To study the transferability of classifiers trained to detect
CNN-generated images, we collected a dataset of images
created from a variety of CNN models, which we call the
ForenSynths dataset.
3.1. Generation models
Our dataset contains 11 synthesis models. We chose
methods that span a variety of CNN architectures, datasets,
and losses. All of these models have an upsampling-
convolutional structure (i.e. they generate images by a se-
ries convolution and upsampling operations) since this is by
far the most common design for generative CNNs. Exam-
ples of their synthesized images can be found in Figure 1.
The statistics of each dataset are listed in Table 1. Details
of the data collection process are provided in the Appendix.
GANs We include three state-of-the-art unconditional
GANs: ProGAN [20], StyleGAN [21], BigGAN [8], trained
on either the LSUN [44] or ImageNet [39] datasets. The
network structures and training procedures for these mod-
els contain significant differences. ProGAN and Style-
GAN train a different network for each category; StyleGAN
injects large, per-pixel noise into the model to introduce
high frequency detail. BigGAN has a monolithic, class-
conditional structure, is trained on very large batch sizes,
and uses self-attention layers [46, 43].
We also include three conditional GANs: the state-of-
the-art image-to-image translation method GauGAN [33],
and the popular unpaired image-to-image translation meth-
ods CycleGAN [52] and StarGAN [11].
Perceptual loss We consider models that directly opti-
mize a perceptual loss [19], with no adversarial training.
This includes Cascaded Refinement Networks (CRN) [10],
which synthesizes images in a coarse-to-fine manner,
and the recent Implicit Maximum Likelihood Estimation
(IMLE) conditional image translation model [25].
Low-level vision We include the Seeing In The Dark
(SITD) model [9], which approximates long-exposure pho-
tography under low light conditions from short-exposure
raw camera input using a high-resolution fully convo-
lutional network. We also use a state-of-the-art super-
resolution model, the Second Order Attention Network
(SAN) [14].
Family Method Image Source # Images
Unconditional
GAN
ProGAN [20] LSUN 8.0k
StyleGAN [21] LSUN 12.0k
BigGAN [8] ImageNet 4.0k
Conditional
GAN
CycleGAN [52] Style/object transfer 2.6k
StarGAN [11] CelebA 4.0k
GauGAN [33] COCO 10.0k
Perceptual
loss
CRN [10] GTA 12.8k
IMLE [25] GTA 12.8k
Low-level
vision
SITD [9] Raw camera 360
SAN [14] Standard SR benchmark 440
Deepfake FaceForensics++ [38] Videos of faces 5.4k
Table 1: Generation models. We evaluate forensic classifiers on
a variety of CNN-based image generation methods.
Deep fakes We also evaluate our model on the face re-
placement images provided in the FaceForensics++ bench-
mark of Ro¨ssler et al. [38], which used the publicly avail-
able faceswap tool [1]. While “deepfake” is often used
as a general term, we take inspiration from the convention
in [38] and refer to this specific model as DeepFake. This
model uses an autoencoder to generate faces, and images
undergo extensive post-processing steps, including Poisson
image blending [34]. Following [38], we use cropped faces.
3.2. Generating fake images
We collect images from the models, taking care to match
the pre-processing operations performed by each (e.g. re-
sizing and cropping). For each dataset, we collect fake im-
ages by generating them from the model without applying
additional post-processing (or we download the officially
released generated images if they are available). We collect
an equal number of real images from each method’s training
set. To make the distribution of the real and fake images as
close as possible, real images are pre-processed according
to the pipeline prescribed by each method.
Since 256×256 resolution is the most commonly shared
output size among most off-the-shelf image synthesis mod-
els (e.g., CycleGAN, StarGAN, ProGAN LSUN, GauGAN
COCO, IMLE, etc.), we used this resolution for our dataset.
For models that produce images at lower resolutions, (e.g.,
DeepFake), we rescale the images using bilinear interpo-
lation to 256 on the shorter side with the same aspect ra-
tio, and for models that produce images at higher resolu-
tion (e.g., ProGAN, StyleGAN, SAN, SITD), we keep the
images at the same resolution. Despite these cases being
slightly different from our training scheme, we observe that
our model is still able to detect fake images under these cat-
egories. For all datasets, we make our real/fake prediction
from 224× 224 crops.
Family Name
Training settings Individual test generators Total
Train Input
No.
Class
Augments Pro-
GAN
Style-
GAN
Big-
GAN
Cycle-
GAN
Star-
GAN
Gau-
GAN CRN IMLE SITD SAN
Deep-
Fake mAP
Blur JPEG
Zhang
et al.
[48]
Cyc-Im CycleGAN RGB – 84.3 65.7 55.1 100. 99.2 79.9 74.5 90.6 67.8 82.9 53.2 77.6
Cyc-Spec CycleGAN Spec – 51.4 52.7 79.6 100. 100. 70.8 64.7 71.3 92.2 78.5 44.5 73.2
Auto-Im AutoGAN RGB – 73.8 60.1 46.1 99.9 100. 49.0 82.5 71.0 80.1 86.7 80.8 75.5
Auto-Spec AutoGAN Spec – 75.6 68.6 84.9 100. 100. 61.0 80.8 75.3 89.9 66.1 39.0 76.5
Blur+JPEG (Big) BigGAN RGB 1000 X X 85.1 82.4 100. 86.2 87.4 96.7 79.7 82.6 91.2 71.9 60.3 83.9
Ours
2-class ProGAN RGB 2 X X 98.8 78.3 66.4 88.7 87.3 87.4 94.0 97.3 85.2 52.9 58.1 81.3
4-class ProGAN RGB 4 X X 99.8 87.0 74.0 93.2 92.3 94.1 95.8 97.5 87.8 58.5 59.6 85.4
8-class ProGAN RGB 8 X X 99.9 94.2 78.9 94.3 91.9 95.4 98.9 99.4 91.2 58.6 63.8 87.9
16-class ProGAN RGB 16 X X 100. 98.2 87.7 96.4 95.5 98.1 99.0 99.7 95.3 63.1 71.9 91.4
No aug ProGAN RGB 20 100. 96.3 72.2 84.0 100. 67.0 93.5 90.3 96.2 93.6 98.2 90.1
Blur only ProGAN RGB 20 X 100. 99.0 82.5 90.1 100. 74.7 66.6 66.7 99.6 53.7 95.1 84.4
JPEG only ProGAN RGB 20 X 100. 99.0 87.8 93.2 91.8 97.5 99.0 99.5 88.7 78.1 88.1 93.0
Blur+JPEG (0.5) ProGAN RGB 20 X X 100. 98.5 88.2 96.8 95.4 98.1 98.9 99.5 92.7 63.9 66.3 90.8
Blur+JPEG (0.1) ProGAN RGB 20 † † 100. 99.6 84.5 93.5 98.2 89.5 98.2 98.4 97.2 70.5 89.0 92.6
Table 2: Cross-generator generalization results. We show the average precision (AP) of various classifiers from baseline Zhang et al. [48]
and ours, tested across 11 generators. Symbols X and † mean the augmentation is applied with 50% or 10% probability, respectively, at
training. Chance is 50% and best possible performance is 100%. When test generators are used in training, we show those results in
gray (as they are not testing generalization). Values in black show cross-generator generalization. Amongst those, the highest value is
highlighted in black. We show ablations with respect to fewer classes in ProGAN and by removing data augmentation. We report the mean
AP by averaging the AP scores over all datasets. Subsets are plotted in Figures 3, 4, 5 for comparison.
4. Detecting CNN-synthesized images
Are there common features or artifacts shared across
diverse CNN generators? To understand this, we study
whether it is possible to train a forensics classifier on images
from one model that generalize to those of many models.
4.1. Training classifiers
While all of these models are useful for evaluation, due
to limitations in dataset size, not all are well-suited to train-
ing a classifier. We take advantage of the fact that the un-
conditional GAN models in our dataset can synthesize ar-
bitrary numbers of images, and choose one specific model,
ProGAN [20] to train the detector on. The decision to use a
single model for training most closely resembles real world
detection problems, where the diversity or number of mod-
els to generalize on are unknown at training time. By select-
ing only a single model to train on, we are computing an up-
per bound on how challenging the task is — jointly training
on multiple models would make the generalization problem
easier. We chose ProGAN since it generates high quality
images and has a simple convolutional network structure.
We then create a large-scale dataset that consists solely
of ProGAN-generated images and real images. We use 20
models each trained on a different LSUN [44] object cat-
egory, and generate 36K train images and 200 validation
images, each with equal numbers of real and fake images
for each model. In total there are 720K images for training
and 4K images for validation.
The main idea of our experiments is to train a “real-or-
fake” classifier on this ProGAN dataset, and evaluate how
well the model generalizes to other CNN-synthesized im-
ages. For the choice of classifier, we use ResNet-50 [16]
Figure 2: Precision and recall curves. The PR curves on each
dataset from the (Blur+JPEG (0.1)) model are shown. Note that
AP is defined as the area under the PR curve. Higher AP indicates
better trade-off between precision and recall, and vice versa.
pre-trained with ImageNet, and train it in a binary classifica-
tion setting. Details of the training procedure are provided
in the Appendix.
Data augmentation During training, we simulate image
post-processing operations in a variety of ways. All of our
models are trained with images that are randomly left-right
flipped and cropped to 224 pixels. We evaluate several ad-
ditional augmentation variants: (1) No aug: no augmenta-
tion applied, (2) Gaussian blur: before cropping, with 50%
probability, images are blurred with σ ∼ Uniform[0, 3], (3)
JPEG: with 50% probability images are JPEG-ed by two
popular libraries, OpenCV [7] and the Python Imaging Li-
brary (PIL), with quality∼ Uniform{30, 31, . . . , 100}, (4a)
Blur+JPEG (0.5): the image is possibly blurred and JPEG-
ed, each with 50% probability, (4b) Blur+JPEG (0.1): sim-
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Figure 3: Effect of augmentation methods. All detectors are trained on ProGAN, and tested on other generators (AP shown). In general,
training with augmentation helps performance. Notable exceptions are super-resolution and DeepFake.
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Figure 4: Effect of dataset diversity. All detectors are trained on ProGAN, and tested on other generators (AP shown). Training with
more classes improves performance. All runs use blur and JPEG augmentation with 50% probability.
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Figure 5: Model comparison. Compared to Zhang et al. [48], we observe that for the most part, our models generalize better to other
architectures. Notable exceptions to this are CycleGAN (which is identical to the training architecture from [48]), StarGAN (where both
methods obtain close to 100. AP), and SAN (where applying data augmentation hurts performance).
ilar to (4a), but with 10% probability.
To evaluate the choice of training architecture, we also
include a model that is trained solely on the BigGAN
dataset, denoted by Blur+JPEG (Big). For comparison, we
train the model with the same data augmentation as (4a).
Evaluation Following other recent forensics works [50,
17, 42], we evaluate our model’s performance on each
dataset using average precision (AP), since it is a threshold-
less, ranking-based score that is not sensitive to the base
rate of the real and fake images in the dataset. We com-
pute this score for each dataset separately, since we expect
it to be dependent on the semantic content of the photos
as a whole. To help interpret the threshold-less results, we
also conduct experiments on thresholding the model’s out-
puts and computing accuracy, under the assumption that real
and fake images are equally likely to appear (Section 4.6).
During testing, each image is center-cropped without resiz-
ing in order to match the post-processing pipeline used by
models during training. No data augmentation is included
during testing; instead, we conduct experiments on model
robustness under post-processing in Section 4.2.
4.2. Effect of data augmentation
In Table 2, we investigate the generalization ability of
training with different augmentation methods. We find that
using aggressive data augmentation (in the form of sim-
ulated post-processing) provides surprising generalization
capabilities, even when such perturbations are not used at
test time. Additionally, we observe that these models are
significantly more robust to post-processing (Figure 6).
Augmentation (usually) improves generalization To
begin, we first evaluate ProGAN-based classifier without
augmentation, shown in the “no aug” row. As in previous
work [38], we find that testing on held-out ProGAN images
works well (100.0 AP). We then test how well it general-
izes to other unconditional GANs. We find that it general-
izes extremely well to StyleGAN, which has a similar net-
work structure, but not as well to BigGAN. When adding
augmentations, the performance on BigGAN significantly
improves, 72.2 → 88.2. On conditional models (Cycle-
GAN, GauGAN, CRN, and IMLE), performance is simi-
larly improved, 84.0 → 96.8, 67.0 → 98.1, 93.5 → 98.9,
90.3→ 99.5, respectively.
Interestingly, there are two models, SAN and DeepFake,
Robustness to Blur Robustness to JPEG
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ProGAN StyleGAN BigGAN CycleGAN
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Blur only
JPEG only
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Figure 6: Robustness. We show the effect of AP given test-time perturbation to (left) Gaussian blurring and (right) JPEG. We show
classifiers trained on ProGAN, with different augmentations applied during training. Note that in all cases and both perturbations, when
training without augmentation (red), performance degrades across all datasets when perturbations are added. In most cases, training
with both augmentations, performs best or near best. Notable exceptions are for super-resolution (where no augmentation is best), and
DeepFake, where training only with the perturbation used during testing, rather than both, performs best.
where directly training on ProGAN without augmentation
performs strongly (93.6 and 98.2, respectively), but aug-
mentation hurts performance. As SAN is a super-resolution
model, only high-frequency components can differentiate
between real and fake images. Removing such cues at train-
ing time (e.g. by blurring) would therefore be likely to re-
duce performance. Applying augmentation, but at reduced
rate (Blur+JPEG (0.1)), offers a good balance: DeepFake
detection is comparable to the no-augmentation case (89.0),
while most other datasets are significantly improved over no
augmentation.
Augmentation improves robustness In many real-world
scenarios, images that we would like to evaluate have un-
dergone unknown post-processing operations, such as com-
pression and resizing. We investigated whether CNN-
generated images can still be detected, even after these post-
processing steps. To test this, we blurred (simulating re-
sampling) and JPEG-compressed the real and fake images
following the protocol in [42], and evaluated our ability to
detect them (Figure 6). On ProGAN (i.e. the case where
the test distribution matches the training), performance is
100% even when applying augmentation operations, indi-
cating that artifacts may not only be high-frequency, but
exist across frequency bands. In terms of cross-generator
generalization, the augmented model is most robust to post-
processing operations that are included in data augmenta-
tion, agreeing with observations from [38, 42, 45, 48].
However, we note that our model also gains robustness
from augmentation even when testing on out-of-distribution
CNN models.
4.3. Effect of data diversity
Next, we asked how the diversity of the real and fake
images in the training set affects a classifier’s generalization
ability.
Image diversity improves performance To study this,
we varied the number of classes in the dataset used to
train our real-or-fake classifier (Figure 4). Specifically, we
trained multiple classifiers, each one on a subset of the full
training dataset by excluded both real and fake images de-
rived from a specific set of LSUN classes. We found that
increasing the training set diversity improves performance,
but only up to a point. When the number of classes used in-
creases from 2 to 16 AP consistently improves, but we see
diminishing returns, and in the end only minimal improve-
ment when increasing the number of classes from 16 to 20.
This indicates that there may be a training dataset that is
“diverse enough” for practical generalization.
Comparison to training on a different model To test
to see whether our conclusions from ProGANs generalize
StyleGAN BigGAN CycleGAN StarGAN GauGAN CRN IMLE SITD SAN DeepFake
Uncalibrated 87.1 58.8 79.7 79.4 78.7 82.9 92.9 85.8 50.0 52.5
Oracle 96.8 81.1 86.3 92.8 85.5 95.3 95.4 92.8 68.0 80.7
Two-shot 91.9 74.0 82.4 86.0 79.1 91.6 91.2 88.7 54.8 65.7
Table 3: Two-shot classifier calibration. We show the accuracy of the classifiers directly trained from ProGAN (“uncalibrated”), after
calibrating the threshold given two examples in the test distribution (“two-shot”) and an upper bound, given a perfect calibration (“oracle”).
to training on a different model, we also train a classifier
on data from an ImageNet-pretrained 256 × 256 BigGAN
model [8]. We generate 400k fake images, and take 400k
ImageNet images with the same class distribution as real
images. We see in Table 2 that this model also exhibits gen-
eralization, albeit with slightly lower results in most cases.
One explanation for this is that while our ProGANs model
was trained on an ensemble (one model per class), BigGAN
images were generated with a single model.
4.4. Comparison to other models
Next, we asked how our generalization performance
compares to other proposed forensic methods. We compare
our approach to Zhang et al. [48], which is a suite of classi-
fiers trained to detect artifacts generated by a common CNN
architecture, which is shared by many image synthesis tasks
such as CycleGAN and StarGAN. They introduced Auto-
GAN, an autoencoder based on CycleGAN’s generator that
simulates artifacts resembling that of CycleGAN images.
We considered four variations of pretrained models from
Zhang et al. [48], each trained from one of the two image
sources (CycleGAN and AutoGAN), and one of the two im-
age representations (images and spectrum) respectively. All
four variants included JPEG and resize data augmentation
during training to improve the robustness of each model.
We found that our models generalized significantly better
to other architectures, except on CycleGAN (which is the
model architecture used by [48]), StarGAN (where both
methods obtain near 100.0 AP). The comparison results are
shown in Table 2 and Figure 5.
4.5. New CNN models
We hope that as new deep synthesis models arrive, our
system will detect them out-of-the-box. One such an evalu-
ation scenario has naturally arisen, with the recent release of
StyleGAN2 [22], a state-of-the-art unconditional GAN. The
StyleGAN2 model makes several changes to StyleGAN,
including redesigned normalization, multi-resolution, and
regularization methods. In Table 4, we test our detector
on publicly available StyleGAN2 generators. We used our
Blur+JPEG (0.1) model and tested on the LSUN car, cat,
church, and horse variants. Despite these changes, our tech-
nique performs at 99.1% AP. These results reinforce the no-
tion that training on today’s generators can generalize well
to future generators, given that they use similar underlying
building blocks.
Uncalib.
acc.
Two-shot
calib. acc. AP
ProGAN [20] 100. – 100.
StyleGAN [21] 87.1 91.9 99.6
StyleGAN2 [22] 84.4 88.8 99.1
Table 4: Out-of-the box evaluation on recently released Style-
GAN2 [22] model. We used our Blur+JPEG (0.1) model and
tested on StyleGAN2. We observed that our model generalizes to
detecting StyleGAN2 images. Numbers for ProGAN and Style-
GAN are included for comparison.
4.6. Other evaluation metrics
To help clarify the threshold-less AP evaluation metric,
we also computed several other metrics (Table 3). We pro-
vide the precision and recall curve on each dataset from our
(Blur+JPEG (0.1)) model in Figure 2. We give the uncali-
brated generalization accuracy of the model on the test dis-
tribution, by simply using the classifier threshold we learned
during training, and oracle accuracy that chooses the thresh-
old that maximizes accuracy on the test set. We also con-
sider a two-shot regime where we have access to one real
and one fake image from each dataset, and only the model’s
threshold is adjusted during the two-shot calibration pro-
cess. Details of the two-shot calibration are provided in the
Appendix.
4.7. Qualitative Analysis
To understand how the network is able to generalize to
unseen CNN models, we study what possible cues the clas-
sifier might be using by visualizing its ranking on the “fak-
eness” over the synthetic dataset. In addition, we analyze
the difference between the frequency responses of both real
and synthetic images across datasets.
“Fakeness” ranking by the model We study whether
our model is learning subtle low-level features generated
by CNN architectures, or high-level features such as visual
quality. Taking the similar approach as previous image real-
ism works [24, 51], we rank synthesized images from each
dataset by the model’s prediction, and visualize images in
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Figure 7: Does our model’s confidence correlate with visual quality? We have found that for two models, BigGAN and StarGAN, the
images on the left (considered more real) tends to look better than the images on the right (considered more fake). However, this does not
seem to hold for the other models. More examples on each dataset are provided in the Appendix.
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Figure 8: Frequency analysis on each dataset. We show the average spectra of each high-pass filtered image, for both the real and fake
images, similar to Zhang et al. [48]. We observe periodic patterns (dots or lines) in most of the synthetic images, while BigGAN and
ProGAN contains relatively few such artifacts.
the 0th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 100th percentile of the “fakeness”
score from our model’s output.
In most datasets, we observe little noticeable correlation
between the model predictions and the visual quality of the
synthesized images. However, there is a weak correlation
in the BigGAN and StarGAN datasets; qualitative examples
are shown in Figure 7. As the “fakeness” scores are higher,
the images tend to contain more visible artifacts which dete-
riorate the visual quality. This implies that our model might
learn to capture perceptual realism under this task. How-
ever, since the correlation is not observed in other datasets,
it is more likely that the model learns features more towards
low-level CNN artifacts. Examples across all datasets are
provided in the Appendix.
Artifacts of CNN image synthesis Inspired by Zhang et
al. [48], we visualize the average frequency spectra from
each dataset to study the artifacts generated by CNNs, as
shown in Figure 8. Following prior work, we perform
a simple form of high-pass filtering (subtracting the im-
age from its median blurred version) before calculating the
Fourier transform, as it provides a more informative visual-
ization [29]. For each dataset, we average over 2000 ran-
domly chosen images (or the entire set, if it is smaller).
We note that there are many interesting patterns visi-
ble in these visualizations. While the real image spectra
generally look alike (with minor variations due to differ-
ences in the datasets), there are distinct patterns visible in
images generated by different CNN models. Furthermore,
the repeated period patterns in these spectra may be consis-
tent with aliasing artifacts, a cue considered by [48]. In-
terestingly, the most effective unconditional GANs (Big-
GAN, ProGAN) contain relatively few such artifacts. Also,
DeepFake images does not contain obvious artifacts. We
note that DeepFake images have gone through various pre-
and post-processing, where the synthesized face region is
resized, blended, and compressed with MPEG. These op-
erations perturbs the low-level image statistic, which may
cause the frequency patterns to not emerge with this visual-
ization method.
5. Discussion
Despite the alarm that has been raised by the rapidly im-
proving quality of image synthesis methods, our results sug-
gest that today’s CNN-generated images retain detectable
fingerprints that distinguish them from real photos. This
allows forensic classifiers to generalize from one model to
another without extensive adaptation.
However, this does not mean that the current situation
will persist. Due to the difficulties in achieving Nash equi-
libria, none of the current GAN-based architectures are
optimized to convergence, i.e. the generator never wins
against the discriminator. Were this to change, we would
suddenly find ourselves in a situation when synthetic im-
ages are completely indistinguishable from real ones.
Even with the current techniques, there remain practi-
cal reasons for concern. First, even the best forensics de-
tector will have some trade-off between true detection and
false-positive rates. Since a malicious user is typically look-
ing to create a single fake image (rather than a distribu-
tion of fakes), they could simply hand-pick the fake image
which happens to pass the detection threshold. Second, ma-
licious use of fake imagery is likely be deployed on a social
media platform (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.), so the
data will undergo a number of often aggressive transforma-
tions (compression, resizing, re-sampling, etc.). While we
demonstrated robustness to some degree of JPEG compres-
sion, blurring, and resizing, much more work is needed to
evaluate how well the current detectors can cope with these
transformations in-the-wild. Finally, most documented in-
stances of effective deployment of visual fakes to date have
been using classic “shallow” methods, such as Photoshop.
We have experimented with running our detector on the
face-aware liquify dataset from [42], and found that our
method performs at chance on this data. This suggests that
shallow methods exhibit fundamentally different behavior
than deep methods, and should not be neglected.
We note that detecting fake images is just one small piece
of the puzzle of how to combat the threat of visual disinfor-
mation. Effective solutions will need to incorporate a wide
range of strategies, from technical to social to legal.
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Appendix
A. Additional Analysis
A.1. “Fakeness” ranking
The “Fakeness” ranking results are included in the fol-
lowing link: https://peterwang512.github.io/
CNNDetection/ranking/. We randomly select 20
real and 20 fake images from each dataset, and rank all
images based on our (Blur+JPEG (0.1)) model’s scores.
Note that there is a clear separation between real and fake
images, where the real images have lower “fakeness” score
and vice versa. Moreover, we observe the synthetic images
ranked more “real” are super resolution (SAN) outputs, and
the ones ranked more “fake” are CRN and IMLE outputs.
However, we observe little noticeable correlation between
the model predictions and the visual quality of the synthe-
sized images in each dataset, where BigGAN and StarGAN
images are the exceptions.
A.2. Effect of dataset size
We include additional ablation studies on the effect of
dataset size, and the results are shown in Table 5. To com-
pare with the dataset diversity ablation in Section 4.3 of the
main text, we train 4 additional models with 10%, 20%,
40%, 80% of the entire dataset respectively, while having
all 20 LSUN classes included in the training set. We ob-
serve much less reduction in generalization performance,
indicating data diversity, comparing to dataset size, con-
tributes more towards better CNN detection in general.
B. Implementation Details
B.1. Dataset Collection
ProGAN [20] 2 We take 20 officially released ProGAN
models pretrained on LSUN [44] airplane, bicycle, bird,
boat, bottle, bus, car, cat, chair, cow, dining table, dog,
horse, motorbike, person, potted plant, sheep, sofa, train,
tv-monitor respectively. Following the official code, we
sample the synthetic images with z ∼ N(0, I), and
generate real images by center cropping the images just on
the long edge (center crop length is exactly the length of
the short edge) and then resizing to 256× 256
StyleGAN [21] 3 We take officially released StyleGAN
models pretrained on LSUN [44] bedroom, cat and car,
with size 256× 256, 256× 256 and 512× 384 respectively.
We download the released synthesized images, all of which
are generated with 0.5 truncation, and following the code,
we generate real images by resizing to the according size
2
https://github.com/tkarras/progressive_growing_of_gans
3
https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan
of each category.
StyleGAN2 [22] 4 We take officially released StyleGAN2
config-F models pretrained on LSUN [44] church, cat,
horse and car, with size 256 × 256, 256 × 256, 256 × 256
and 512 × 384 respectively. We download the released
synthesized images, all of which are generated with 0.5
truncation, and following the code, we generate real images
by resizing to the according size of each category.
BigGAN [8] 5 We take officially released BigGAN-deep
model pretrained on 256×256 ImageNet images. Following
the official code, we sample the images with uniform class
distribution and with 0.4 truncation; also, we generate real
images by center cropping the images just on the long edge
(center crop length is exactly the length of the short edge)
and then resizing to 256× 256.
CycleGAN [52] 6 We take officially released CycleGAN
models: apple2orange, orange2apple, horse2zebra, ze-
bra2horse, summer2winter, winter2summer, and generate
real and fake image pairs out of all six categories. Pre-
processed real images and synthetic images are directly
generated from the released code.
StarGAN [11] 7 We take officially released StarGAN
model pretrained on CelebA [27], and generate real and
fake image pairs. Pre-processed real images and synthetic
images are directly generated from the released code.
GauGAN [33] 8 We take officially released GauGAN
model pretrained on COCO [26], and generate real and fake
image pairs. Pre-processed real images and synthetic im-
ages are directly generated from the released code.
CRN [10] 9 We take officially released CRN model pre-
trained on GTA, and generate synthesized images from pre-
processed segmentation maps. Pre-processed real images
and segmentation maps are downloaded from the IMLE
repository.
IMLE [25] 10 We take officially released IMLE model
pretrained on GTA, and generate synthesized images from
pre-processed segmentation maps. Pre-processed real im-
ages and segmentation maps are downloaded from the offi-
cial repository.
SITD [9] 11 We take officially released pretrained model
and the dataset by Sony and Fuji cameras from the repos-
itory. Pre-processed real images and synthetic images are
directly generated from the released code.
4
https://github.com/NVlabs/stylegan2
5
https://tfhub.dev/s?q=biggan
6
https://github.com/junyanz/pytorch-CycleGAN-and-pix2pix
7
https://github.com/yunjey/stargan
8
https://github.com/NVlabs/SPADE
9
https://github.com/CQFIO/PhotographicImageSynthesis
10
https://github.com/zth667/Diverse-Image-Synthesis-from-Semantic-Layout
11
https://github.com/cchen156/Learning-to-See-in-the-Dark
Family Name
Training settings Individual test generators Total
Train Input
No.
Class
Augments Pro-
GAN
Style-
GAN
Big-
GAN
Cycle-
GAN
Star-
GAN
Gau-
GAN CRN IMLE SITD SAN
Deep-
Fake mAP
Blur JPEG
Ours
2-class ProGAN RGB 2 X X 98.8 78.3 66.4 88.7 87.3 87.4 94.0 97.3 85.2 52.9 58.1 81.3
4-class ProGAN RGB 4 X X 99.8 87.0 74.0 93.2 92.3 94.1 95.8 97.5 87.8 58.5 59.6 85.4
8-class ProGAN RGB 8 X X 99.9 94.2 78.9 94.3 91.9 95.4 98.9 99.4 91.2 58.6 63.8 87.9
16-class ProGAN RGB 16 X X 100. 98.2 87.7 96.4 95.5 98.1 99.0 99.7 95.3 63.1 71.9 91.4
10% data ProGAN RGB 20 X X 100. 93.2 82.3 94.1 93.2 97.1 96.8 99.4 88.2 58.1 63.5 87.8
20% data ProGAN RGB 20 X X 100. 96.8 85.9 95.9 93.6 97.9 98.7 99.5 90.2 61.8 65.2 89.6
40% data ProGAN RGB 20 X X 100. 97.8 87.5 96.0 95.3 98.1 98.2 99.3 91.2 61.4 67.9 90.2
80% data ProGAN RGB 20 X X 100. 98.1 88.1 96.4 95.4 98.0 98.9 99.4 93.0 63.8 65.0 90.8
Blur+JPEG (0.5) ProGAN RGB 20 X X 100. 98.5 88.2 96.8 95.4 98.1 98.9 99.5 92.7 63.9 66.3 90.8
Table 5: Effect of dataset size. Same as Table 2 in the main text, we show the average precision (AP) of classifiers trained with various
dataset size, tested across 11 generators. For comparison, we include the ablations on the number of classes and the Blur+JPEG (0.5)
model’s results, which are presented in the main text. Symbols X means the augmentation is applied with 50% or probability at training.
The color coding scheme is identical to that of Table 2 in the main text. We note that when only the dataset size is reduced, AP dropped
less comparing to reducing the number of classes.
SAN [14] 12 We take both the ground truth and the offi-
cially released 4x super-resolution predictions on the stan-
dard benchmark datasets: Set5, Set14, BSD100 and Ur-
ban100. The synthetic images are directly downloaded from
the repository.
DeepFake [38] 13 We download raw manipulated and
original image sequences in the validation and test split of
the Deepfakes dataset. We extracted all frames from the
videos, and in each frame a face is detected and cropped
using Faced [2]. Similar to [38], our dataset is comprised
entirely of cropped faces.
B.2. Training details
To train the classifiers, we use the Adam optimizer [23]
with β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999, batch size 64, and initial learn-
ing rate 10−4. Learning rate are dropped by 10× if after 5
epochs the validation accuracy does not increase by 0.1%,
and we terminate training at learning rate 10−6. One excep-
tion is that, in order to balance training iterations with the
size of the training set, for the {2, 4, 8, 16}-class models
and the {10, 20, 40, 80}%-data models, the learning rate is
dropped if the validation accuracy plateaus for {50, 25, 13,
7} epochs instead.
B.3. Two-shot calibration
We calibrate the model by a single random real and fake
pair, and we augment the image pair by taking 224 × 224
random crops 128 times. The images are passed into the
model to get the logits, which are then fitted by a logistic
regression (the method is also known as Platt scaling [35]).
We take the bias learned from the logistic regression to ad-
just the base rate of our model. Specifically, we apply the
bias to our model’s logit and then take the sigmoid to get
the calibrated probability.
12
https://github.com/daitao/SAN
13
https://github.com/ondyari/FaceForensics
